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Abstract
We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the diﬀerence in the
method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conﬂict. We distinguish those negoti-
ations that take place previous to a potential conﬂict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside
the conﬂict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to
achieve a certain balance between the eﬃciency of the agreement and the equality of the
sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose
delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also ﬁnd how the “weak” player in
the conﬂict can strategically proﬁt from the mediator’s quest for equality. Finally, we show
how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher
in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a crucial feature in many real-life economic negotiations that is still poorly understood
by the literature on bargaining and conﬂict resolution: the role played by arbitrators and me-
diators in negotiation processes. The importance of these professional negotiators is clear. In
most international negotiations, the United Nations (UN) sends a group of diplomats (super-
vised by a main negotiator) whose aim is to help the parties involved in the conﬂict to achieve a
successful agreement. In other domains, such as domestic conﬂicts caused by damaging strikes,
the legislation usually allows governments to impose an arbitrator to the parties.1
The purpose of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst step in the analysis of mediators in conﬂicts
using a game-theoretical approach. We focus on mediators that have the capacity to strategi-
cally intervene in a conﬂict or negotiation, contrary to arbitrators that impose an agreement to
the parties involved in the negotiation.2 In our framework, the mediator does not beneﬁtf r o m
transfers of the parties involved in the conﬂict, and her intervention is driven by her interest
in achieving a certain balance between the eﬃciency and the equality of the ﬁnal agreement.
Moreover, her mediation activity is not conducted through the promise of monetary transfers
to the parties, but through her capacity to alter the way in which negotiations are conducted
by threatening the parties with the blockage of proposals that she considers as “unacceptable”.
Behaving in this way, the mediator is able to alter the strategic incentives in the negotiation.
In particular, the mediator can choose between allowing the agents involved in the (potential)
conﬂict to conduct direct (face-to-face) negotiations, or forcing them to undertake indirect (me-
diated) negotiations. In face-to-face negotiations, the two parties confront each other in a typical
Rubinstein way (see Rubinstein (1982)). In mediated negotiations, the oﬀers of the parties go
through the mediator, who decides whether to convey them to the other party, or not.
In spite of its importance, and as far as we are aware, the literature on Bargaining has seldom
approached the role of these negotiators, and has essentially done it by treating them as passive
agents with an exogenously predetermined role. On the one hand, the approach followed by
Compte and Jehiel (1995) and Manzini and Mariotti (2001), analyzes the role of arbitrators as
pre-ﬁxed outside options of the bargaining process. On the other hand, Jarque, et al. (2003)
and Copic and Ponsatí (2003) study mediators as information ﬁlters in a context of two-sided
asymmetric information. In these cases, the role of the mediators is to make the agreement public
as soon as the parties have made mutually acceptable oﬀers. An exception to these approaches
are the works by Ponsatí (2001) and Manzini and Ponsatí (2002), in which third-parties take
strategic decisions that may aﬀect the negotiation process. In their models, these parties are
stake-holders (agents indirectly aﬀected by the outcome of the bargaining process), and they
1For an example of this arbitration, see the strike in the Spanish Airline IBERIA in July 2001, that was ended
after a compulsory arbitration process imposed by the Spanish Government.







 intervene in the negotiation through the promise of monetary transfers to the contenders in
order to ease the termination of the conﬂict.
Another important issue of this paper is that it allows us to analyze and compare the role
of the mediators in situations of diﬀerent nature, where the two parties negotiate to share a
ﬁxed surplus. Often, a distinction is made between peacekeeping negotiations (pre-conﬂict) and
peacemaking negotiations (in-conﬂict). This distinction is common in war conﬂicts (peacekeeping
versus peacemaking), but also in labor conﬂicts (before strike versus in-strike). The former,
corresponds to situations in which the negotiation tries to achieve an agreement that avoids the
declaration of a potential conﬂict. In the latter, the conﬂict has already started, and the aim
of the negotiation process is to ﬁnd a way to stop it. In this case, each player suﬀers a cost of
conﬂict each period until an agreement is reached.3
The following quotation from an interview with Françesc Vendrell (former UN-Secretary
General’s Personal Representative for Afghanistan, a UN negotiator with more than 30 years
of experience in international conﬂicts) can help us to illustrate the important link between
the way in which negotiations are conducted, and the nature of the conﬂict and, therefore, to
highlight the relevance of the ap p r o a c hp r o p o s e di nt h i sa r t i c l e : 4
“I would rather negotiate pendularly with each party, than with both sides face-
to-face. (.....) I am talking about negotiation processes to conquer the peace, peace-
making, (.....) in which there is a primacy of rounds of contacts over multilateral
meetings. This is diﬀerent to what happens with peacekeeping negotiations.”
The aim of the paper is, in short, to propose a model of bargaining under complete informa-
tion that is able to provide insights about the eﬀects that a mediator can have on the outcome
of a negotiation, distinguishing peacemaking from peacekeeping negotiations.
We obtain interesting results showing that, even in a perfect information setting, the in-
troduction of the mediator can alter substantially the outcome of the negotiation. We ﬁnd
important diﬀerences in the mediator’s intervention depending on the environment of the nego-
tiation. In a peacemaking scenario we show that, even if the mediator is willing to completely
sacriﬁce eﬃciency in order to achieve a higher equality, she is not able to induce a fully egal-
itarian sharing. The reason for this is that the mediator’s capacity to inﬂuence the players is
undermined by the existence of a conﬂict, that generates a ﬂow of damages for the players in
an uneven way. We also prove that, in this case, more equality can be achieved by giving the
initiative in the negotiation process to the ex-ante strong player (in contrast with what happens
3For an analysis of mechanism design problem that explicitly distinguishes among these two alternative envi-
ronments see Porteiro (2007).








 in unmediated bargaining processes). If the mediator gives the ﬁrst mover’s advantage to the
weak player, this agent will strategically use in his favor the higher costs that the continuation
of the conﬂict implies for him.
When moving to a peacekeeping scenario, the position of the mediator, rather than improv-
ing, worsens. In these situations, the conﬂict is only a potential outcome of the process, and
the agents will strategically threaten the mediator with the option of declaring the conﬂict,
and moving to a peacemaking scenario. At equilibrium, the players link the non-acceptance of
their oﬀers to the start of the conﬂict, and this severely undermines the mediator’s capacity to
increase the egalitarianism of the ﬁnal agreement. In particular, we show that, in peacekeeping
negotiations, the intervention of the mediator is unable to induce a more egalitarian sharing than
in face-to-face negotiations. As a conclusion from the analysis of the two diﬀerent scenarios, we
observe that the capacity of the mediator to induce more egalitarian agreements is always higher
in peacemaking negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the economic environment and
the model. Section 3 analyzes the peacemaking situation, that is, the mediation activity when
the conﬂict has already started, and in Section 4 we study the peacekeeping scenario, which
corresponds to a situation prior to a potential conﬂict. Section 5 concludes and comments on
possible extensions. We provide an Appendix in Section 6.
2 The Economic Environment
We model negotiations between two parties in the presence of a potential conﬂict. The players
bargain àl aR u b i n s t e i n ,under complete information, over the division of a ﬁxed surplus with
value s ∈ R+ and with homogeneous discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). Time runs in discrete periods of
equal length, numbered by the natural numbers.
There are two types of negotiations that diﬀer in the timing of the bargaining process with
respect to the conﬂict: peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations. In peacemaking processes,
the conﬂict has already started. The negotiation takes place inside the conﬂi c ta n dt h ep l a y e r s
bargain to try to stop it. In this case, the agents suﬀer a cost of conﬂict each period. The
cost suﬀered by player i each period of conﬂict is (1 − δ)ci. This cost is normalized so that the
discounted cost of being in continuous conﬂict is ci > 0( i =1 ,2). To simplify, we suppose that
c1 = c>c 2 =0 . Hereinafter we will denote the agent who suﬀer the cost of conﬂict (i.e., agent
1) as the “weak” player and agent 2 as the “strong” player.
We also assume that s>c .This means that the conﬂict does not destroy the whole surplus
that can be divided among the two players.5








 In peacekeeping negotiations, the objective of the bargaining process is to divide the surplus
s between the parties, and to avoid the declaration of the conﬂict. Since the conﬂict has not
already started, neither player suﬀers a cost of conﬂict each period. In the bargaining process,
each player has the option of breaking up the negotiations and move to the conﬂict. In case of
opting out, negotiations will continue in a peacemaking environment.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of mediation in these negotiations processes.
We study mediators that have the capacity to strategically intervene in the conﬂict in the fol-
lowing sense: the mediator can choose between allowing the agents involved in the conﬂict to
conduct direct negotiations, or forcing them to undertake indirect negotiations. In direct (face-
to-face) negotiations, the players bargain àl aR u b i n s t e i nand the only role of the mediator
is to choose who is the player that has the right to start the negotiation process. In indirect
(mediated) negotiations, the mediator takes an active role in the process, by deciding whether
to submit an oﬀer to the other party or not. The game is as follows: at any stage, the mediator
meets with the party that has the right to make a proposal. This player makes a proposal to
the mediator, who decides whether or not to submit this proposal to the other player. If the
player receives the proposal, he can either accept it or reject it. If he accepts, the game ends.
If he rejects, or if he does not receive the proposal, he has the right to make a counter-proposal
to the mediator at the following stage, and so on. In this game, if the mediator can credibly
commit not to submit a proposal (that, if submitted, would be accepted), then she will be able
to alter the outcome of the bargaining process. The credibility of the threats depends crucially
on the preferences of the mediator. Her main trade-oﬀ is equality versus eﬃciency. In terms of
eﬃciency, the best the mediator can do is not to block any proposal that, if submitted, would
be accepted. If the mediator wants to aﬀect the ﬁnal sharing, that is, to increase the equality
by reducing the ﬁrst mover advantage of the initial proposer, she has to credibly threaten with
“blocking” proposals, even if this implies (out of equilibrium) a delay in the agreement.
In this work we propose to represent the solution of the equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ of the
mediator through a parameter α ∈ R+. This value measures the mediator’s willingness to sac-
riﬁce joint surplus in order to achieve a greater equality. Formally, we deﬁne the preferences of
the mediator as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider two vectors of payoﬀs for players i and j, (Pi,P j) and (P0
i,P0
j). At y p e - α










j) − (Pi + Pj)
¤
, with α ∈ R+.
The left-hand side of this expression denotes how much more egalitarian is (Pi,P j) with
respect to (P0
i,P0
j), and the right-hand side expresses how much more eﬃcient is (P0
i,P0
j) with







 • α → +∞ : Equality-seeking mediator. A sharing is preferred whenever is more egalitarian.
• α → 0:Eﬃciency-seeking mediator. She selects the most egalitarian sharing, but only
among those that are equally eﬃcient.
Moreover, it allows for intermediate situations where the mediator is willing to sacriﬁce
some eﬃciency, in order to achieve a higher equality.
To understand better the role of the mediator, take the following example from an interna-
tional conﬂict:
Consider a conﬂict between two countries. One of the countries has a very poor army and
its civilian population is likely to suﬀer greatly if the conﬂict is triggered (to be consistent with
notation, we denote it as country 1). The other country, on the contrary, has a very powerful
army and will bear much less the consequences of the conﬂict (country 2). In this setting, in
the absence of a mediator, it is clear that the position of country 1 is very weak and that this
weakness will be reﬂected in the eventual solution of the conﬂict.
Consider now what happens when a mediator (i.e., an international arbitrator) steps in. If
it is common knowledge that this mediator will search for an balanced solution, does this alter
the strategic behaviour of the parties in conﬂict?
In the following sections, we answer this question by analyzing independently the two diﬀer-
ent scenarios: peacemaking and peacekeeping.
3I n - c o n ﬂict Negotiations (Peacemaking)
T h ep l a y e r sa r ei napeacemaking setting, that is, the negotiation takes place inside the conﬂict.
This implies that each player suﬀers a stream of costs while the negotiation takes place.
3.1 Direct (face-to-face) Negotiations
The role of the mediator is to choose, in an initial stage of the negotiation, which of the two
players has the right to start the negotiation.
Denote the player who starts the negotiation as player i.I ne v e n( od d )pe r i od sp l a y e ri (player
j)m a k e sa no ﬀer. The other party may accept, thus terminating the game with agreement at
the proposed shares. If he rejects, bargaining goes on to the next round. Each period until an
agreement is reached, agent 1 suﬀers a cost (1 − δ)c and agent 2 ac o s to f0.
Proposition 1 For any c ∈ R+ and δ ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of the game where agent 1 starts the negotiation. The payoﬀs, P∗
1 and P∗
2, for agent 1

































Proof. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996).
N o ww ec o m et oa n a l y z et h ed i ﬀerence in payoﬀs between the two players and the decision
of the mediator of choosing who starts the negotiation. The following corollary follows directly
from the previous proposition:
Corollary 1 The SPE sharing has the following distributional properties:
• If the “strong” player (agent 2) starts the negotiation, then he receives a bigger share than
the “weak” player (agent 1).
• If the “weak” player (agent 1) starts the negotiation, then he receives a bigger share than







This Corollary highlights the trade-oﬀ faced by the “weak” player. The fact that he bears
higher conﬂict costs (c>0) gives him a worse bargaining position with respect to the “strong”
player, but the ﬁrst-mover advantage is beneﬁcial for him. The eﬀect that dominates is deter-
mined by the value of the parameters of the model. If the overall size of the surplus to share is
relatively high with respect to the conﬂict cost, then the positive eﬀect associated with having
the initiative in the negotiation dominates, and gives agent 1 a higher payoﬀ in the ﬁnal sharing.
Proposition 2 In direct negotiations under peacemaking, the mediator will always choose the











Proof. Direct from Proposition 1.
3.2 Indirect (mediated) Negotiations
The main diﬀerence of this scenario in comparison with the direct (face-to-face) case is the role
of the mediator. She meets independently with each party and decides whether or not to submit







 T h ep r o c e s si sa sf o l l o w s :a ta n ys t a g et the mediator meets with the party that has the
right to make a proposal (player i). This player makes a proposal. Then the mediator decides
whether or not to submit this proposal to player j.I f p l a y e r j receives the proposal, he can
either accept it or reject it. If he accepts, the game ends. If he rejects, or if he does not receive
i0s proposal, he has the right to make a counter-proposal to the mediator at stage t+1,a n dt h e
process is repeated.
Characterization of the Equilibrium with Mediator We ﬁr s ts o l v et h ee q u i l i b r i u mf o r
all possible types of mediators, that is, for all the possible values of α. Then, we comment on
the two extreme cases. We restrict the analysis to stationary strategies.
The following Proposition describes the equilibria of this game. The diﬀerent equilibrium
payoﬀs for each of the cases are described in the proof of the Proposition that is provided in the
Appendix (in the main text we provide a sketch of this proof). We use the following notation:
α1 =
(1 + δ)2(s + c)
s(1 − δ2) − c(1 − δ)2,α 2 =
(1 − δ2 +2 δ)(s + c)






(1 − δ2)(s + c)
(1 − δ)2s +( 3+δ2)c
.
Proposition 3 In indirect negotiations the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) is
characterized as follows:
• If α ≤ min{1,α 3}, then the equilibrium is unmediated.
• If α ≥ max{α1,α 2} and s
c > 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 , then the equilibrium is fully mediated.
• If α ≥ 1 and s
c < 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 ,o rmax{1,α 4} ≤ α ≤ max{α1,α 2} and s
c > 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 , then the
equilibrium is partially mediated.
• If α3 ≤ α ≤ α4 and s
c > 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 , then the equilibrium is unmediated or partially
mediated.
The intuition of the proof is the following: Note that the only stationary strategies that can
be optimal for each agent are the following: agent 1 always oﬀers (x,s−x) and rejects anything
less than w. Agent 2 always oﬀers (y,s− y) and rejects anything less than z. The reason is
that if any of the players decides to reject an oﬀer, then he must reject any other oﬀer that is
strictly worse for him. Moreover, at equilibrium, each player will oﬀer the minimum amount
that the other agent will accept and that the mediator still submits. This implies that w = y
and z = s−x. The necessary conditions for these strategies to be a stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium (SSPE) are the following:







 (2) s − x ≥ δ(s − y).
(3) x ≥ δy − (1 − δ)c.
(4) s − y ≥ δ(s − x).
(M1)
(1−δ)
α (s + c) ≥ |2x − s| − |δ(2y − s) − (1 − δ)c|.
(M2)
(1−δ)
α (s + c) ≥ |2y − s| − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c|.
Conditions (1) to (4) are the usual acceptance/rejection restrictions of the two players. The
optimal strategy of the mediator is determined by conditions (M1) and (M2). The mediator,
when a player makes an oﬀer, will submit the proposal whenever the proposed sharing is preferred
to the one induced by the continuation of the game, taking into account, both eﬃciency and
equality. Condition (M1) ensures that the oﬀer made by agent 1 will not be blocked by the
mediator, that is, the mediator prefers (Pi,P j)=( x,s−x) to (P0
i,P0
j)=( δy − (1 − δ)c,δ(s − y)).
Condition (M2) is the analogous condition for the oﬀer of agent 2. We do not need to specify the
mediator’s strategy because the equilibrium payoﬀs that arise from these conditions are unique.
Note that the left-hand side of the mediator’s condition is the cost in eﬃciency terms of
blocking a proposal and delaying the agreement one period (parametrized by the mediator’s
type α). The right-hand side is the diﬀerence in the equality of the proposals.
We obtain the equilibria of this game analyzing the binding conditions in each case.
We represent in Figure 1 this equilibrium conﬁguration.
[Insert Figure 1]
In this ﬁgure, we represent the mediator’s willingness to sacriﬁce eﬃciency in terms of equality
(parametrized in the model by α) as a function of s
c. Note that the equilibrium of this game has
the following properties: the SSPE payoﬀs can be divided in three cases. First, if α is suﬃciently
low, the mediator is, at equilibrium, completely passive and submits any proposal she receives.
The negotiation is conducted as if there was no ﬁlter to the agents’ proposals. As a result, the
equilibrium sharing coincides with the obtained in the direct negotiation case, since the binding
conditions are (1) and (2).
On the other extreme, if α is suﬃciently high and, at the same time, the damage caused by
the conﬂict is relatively low (i.e. s
c is suﬃciently large), the equilibrium is fully mediated.T h i s
means that the threat of blocking proposals is binding for both agents (conditions (M1) and
(M2)). This way, neither party can fully beneﬁt from his position as a proposer.
For intermediate cases, the equilibrium is partially mediated. In this range of parameter
values, the mediator’s position is not strong enough to drive completely the negotiation but it
still has some inﬂuence over the outcome. At equilibrium, the mediator threats the strong player
in order to reduce his advantage as a proposer, but allows the weak player to completely proﬁt







 Some insights can be extracted from this general characterization. First, note that the medi-
ator’s willingness to sacriﬁce eﬃciency on the grounds of a higher equality crucially determines
the outcome of the negotiations. This commitment to achieve equality, even at the cost of de-
stroying resources if necessary, gives credibility to the mediator’s threat to block proposals and,
hence, alters the equilibrium sharing. Second, an important element that aﬀects the mediator’s
capacity to inﬂuence the negotiation is how costly the conﬂict is. The relative damage of con-
tinuing the conﬂict with respect to the total amount of resources to share (i.e., s
c)m e a s u r e sh o w
costly it is for the mediator to actually intervene in the negotiation.
In order to extract more insights on the implications of an active mediator, we consider
now the prediction that Proposition 3 makes for the two extreme cases of the preferences of the
mediator, that is, eﬃciency-seeking mediator (α → 0), and equality-seeking mediator (α → +∞).
Proposition 4 If α =0(eﬃciency-seeking mediator), the two negotiation processes, that is,
direct and indirect, are equivalent.
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.
This Proposition conﬁrms our previous claim that only mediators that can credibly commit
to delay the negotiations (and, hence, destroy resources), do have an impact on the ﬁnal sharing.
Otherwise, they become simple passive witnesses of the negotiation.
Let us move now to the opposite, and more interesting, case.
Proposition 5 In indirect negotiations with an equality-seeking mediator (α −→ +∞),t h e r e






































Proof. Direct from the Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix.
Several insights emerge from this Proposition. The ﬁrst, and most obvious one is that, even







 she is not able to induce a fully egalitarian sharing. The reason is that the existence of conﬂict
costs that aﬀects more one player than the other, is a source of inequality that undermines
the capacity of the mediator. The tool the mediator has to increase the egalitarianism of the
sharing is to threaten the proposer with blocking his oﬀer (implying a delay in the resolution
of the conﬂict). The larger asymmetry of conﬂict costs, the more inequality this blocking will
generate and, therefore, the weaker the position of the mediator (the less credible her threat).
This implies that, even in the extreme case in which the mediator would postpone indeﬁnitely the
agreement if needed, she is not capable of forcing any of the players to make a fully egalitarian
oﬀer.
Second, the structure of the equilibrium is diﬀerent, depending on the values of the parame-
ters. When s
c ≥ (1+2δ−δ2)
1+δ2 , the equilibrium oﬀers are completely determined by the mediator’s
threats to block their proposals (the equilibrium is fully mediated). In this case, neither player
can, at equilibrium, fully beneﬁt from his position as a proposer. However, if s is relatively low
with respect to the conﬂi c tc o s t( c) (that is, when s
c < (1+2δ−δ2)
1+δ2 ), the equilibrium conﬁguration
is diﬀerent. In this case, the position of agent 1 is very weak with respect to agent 2 and, hence,
the mediator allows the former to fully use his advantage when he is the proposer (agent 1’s oﬀer
is determined by the acceptance-rejection decision of agent 2). At the same time, the mediator
restricts the ﬁrst-mover-advantage of agent 2 (the strongest) using her power to block proposals.
As a result, the equilibrium is only partially mediated.
Focusing on the ﬁrst case, we can see the most striking and, at ﬁrst sight, most counter-
intuitive result of the mediator’s intervention. When the weak player is the proposer, his share of
the surplus is increasing in his own conﬂict costs. In the direct negotiation case, the result was
completely the opposite. The reasoning was simple: the larger the conﬂi c tc o s to fo n ep l a y e r ,
the weaker his bargaining position and, hence, the smaller share of the surplus he gets. However,
this reasoning fails here, because the player’s equilibrium oﬀers are not determined by the other
player’s reaction, but by the mediator’s blocking threat.
In a sense, the “competitor” of agent 1 is not directly agent 2, but rather the mediator. The
stronger the position of the mediator, the less capacity will have agent 1 to exploit his advantage
as a proposer, and vice versa. The higher c, the less credible will be the mediator’s threat to
block proposals, as this would imply an important source of inequality in the ﬁnal sharing. As
a result, the larger c, the bigger the share that agent 1 can ask for himself, without triggering a
block from the mediator. This paradoxical result can also be restated in other terms: the quest
for equality makes the mediator become an agent for the weak player.
The example of the international conﬂi c tw er e f e r r e dt oi nS e c t i o n2m a yh e l pt oc l a r i f y
this point: as we have already argued, in the absence of a mediator, the position of country 1
(with a weak army and civilians being more exposed to the conﬂict) is much weaker. Hence,







 in, if it is common knowledge that this mediator will search for an equitable solution, things
change substantially. Now, the weak country has a new strategic device. The massive suﬀering
of its population if the conﬂict continues, becomes a strategic threat for the mediator. Country
1 knows that the mediator will not be willing to let the conﬂict continue, as this would imply
enlarging the ﬂow of damages for the population of country 1. This “preference for equity” of
the mediator gives the weak country a very strong position at the expense of country 2.
As a consequence of this eﬀect, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 When α →∞ , the mediator achieves a higher equality by giving the initiative










Once again, we see how the presence of an active mediator has very important implications.
The fact that the mediator’s intervention reinforces the negotiation position of the weak player
implies that, contrary to the direct negotiation case, more equality can be achieved by giving
the initiative in the negotiation to the ex-ante strong player, as he has a weaker position with
respect to the mediator.
Finally, one can see how the mediator’s activity, instead of improving over the direct negoti-
ations in terms of equality, can turn out to be detrimental. To show it, we compare the payoﬀs
achieved with direct and indirect negotiations.
From the Proposition above, we know that the payoﬀso ft h eindirect (mediated) negotiation
































































 In Corollary 3 below, we compare the degree of inequality in the presence and in the absence of
the mediator:
Corollary 3 There exist two thresholds in the discount factor, (δ1,δ2), 0 <δ 1 <δ 2 < 1 such
that:
• If δ ≤ δ1 the equality achieved is higher when conducting mediated negotiations.
• If δ ∈ (δ1,δ2) the equality achieved is lower when conducting mediated negotiations.
• If δ ≥ δ2 the equality achieved is higher when conducting mediated negotiations.
Proof. See Appendix.
We represent this result in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2]
In this ﬁgure, we represent the diﬀerence in agents’ payoﬀs (under direct and indirect negotia-
tions) as functions of the discount factor. The result obtained can be, at ﬁrst sight, counterin-
tuitive: the presence of an active mediator that threatens the parties with blocking “unequal”
proposals, may imply, ex-post, a higher degree of inequality. The explanation for this has to
do with the nature of the mediator’s intervention. The presence of conﬂict costs reduces the
eﬀective capacity of the mediator to equalize payoﬀs, and this weakness will be strategically
used by the players in their own beneﬁt.
For extreme cases of δ, the intervention of the mediator always improves over the face-to-face
situation. When the value of δ is very low, then the ﬁrst-mover advantage of the initial proposer
is very important, and the “blocking” capacity of the mediator eﬀectively reduces its impact on
the ﬁnal sharing. On the other extreme, when δ is suﬃciently high the mediator’s intervention
is very successful, since the higher the degree of patience of the players, the higher the capacity
of the mediator to induce an egalitarian sharing.
However, for intermediate values of δ, the inequality of the face-to-face negotiation is rel-
atively low: the ﬁrst-mover-advantage of the “weak” player allows him to compensate for his
higher conﬂict costs in such a way that the ﬁnal sharing is relatively balanced. The interven-
tion of the mediator in this case does not improve the equality achieved in a direct negotiation,
since the players use strategically the “weakness” of the mediation activity, that comes from the
presence of conﬂict costs, in their own beneﬁt.
4P r e c o n ﬂict Negotiations (Peacekeeping)
T h ep l a y e r sa r ei napeacekeeping setting, where negotiations take place prior to a potential







 players that bargain over the division of the surplus have the option of breaking up negotiations
a n dg ot ot h ec o n ﬂict. If this happens, they receive their outside option payoﬀs, that will
be denoted by (P∗
i ,P∗
j ). These payoﬀs will be determined by the outcome of the peacemaking
negotiations. We state the general results in the following Lemma and Proposition, for any
outside payoﬀs that satisfy s ≥ P∗
i +P∗
j . In a posterior analysis, we concentrate on a particular
case of payoﬀs to be able to extract more interesting implications of the mediator’s activity.
4.1 Direct (face-to-face) Negotiations
Agents 1 and 2 bargain over the division of s. Denote the player who starts the negotiation as
player i. Each player has the option of breaking up the negotiations and move to the conﬂict.
In even (odds) periods player i (player j) makes an oﬀer. The other party may accept and the
game ends with agreement at the proposed shares. Alternatively, if he rejects, either of the
two parties may decide to start the conﬂict, in which case both receive their outside payoﬀs,
(P∗
i ,P∗
j ).I f t h e o ﬀer is rejected but neither player opts out, then bargaining goes on to the
following round.
The framework and solution is the one used in Ponsatí and Sákovics (1998), but we restrict
attention to stationary strategies (independent of t) and we allow the outside payoﬀso ft h e
players to be negative. We ﬁrst prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In a direct negotiation under a peacekeeping scenario, for any outside payoﬀs (P∗
i ,P∗
j ) ∈
R2, such that s ≥ P∗
i +P∗
j , immediate agreement at (s−P∗
j ,P∗
j ) is an outcome that can be sup-

















. Otherwise, the outcomes that can be supported by a







At equilibrium each agent links the rejection of his proposal to the start of the conﬂict.
Proof. Consider the following strategies: if player i i st h ep r o p o s e rh ea l w a y sa s k sf o rs−P∗
j ;
the responder accepts any proposal that is not worse than the (candidate) equilibrium proposal;
if the proposer asks for more, then the responder rejects and takes his outside option; if the
responder does not accept a proposal, the proposer opts out. It is straightforward to verify that
these strategies constitute a SSPE.
To prove the second part of the Lemma, note thatf o rt h el o w e s tp o s s i b l es h a r ef o rp l a y e r
i to get at equilibrium we need the following: player i should (weakly) prefer continuing to
opting out when player j rejects his proposal. Otherwise, the only candidate equilibrium oﬀer
will be for player i to ask for s − P∗
j , because player j0s threat to reject would not be credible.














































. Given these conditions,
both players (weakly) prefer this agreement to their option. It is straightforward to see that
these conditions are also suﬃcient.
Note that a necessary condition for having multiplicity of equilibria is that δs > P∗
i + P∗
j .
In the posterior analysis, we concentrate on a particular vector of outside payoﬀsf r o mt h e
peacemaking negotiation to extract more meaningful implications of the mediator’s activity.
Since these payoﬀs do not satisfy this condition, we study in what follows the case where the
unique SSPE payoﬀsa r e(s − P∗
j ,P∗
j ).
From the Lemma above, we observe that, at equilibrium, the proposer threatens with opting
out if his oﬀer is rejected, and this behavior is always credible. This has a direct implication for
the relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping: in a peacekeeping setting, where
the agents face a direct negotiation with the outside option of moving to a peacemaking situation,
the outcome is completely determined by the outcome of the peacemaking process.
This implies that the equilibrium sharing with peacekeeping is, in fact, the same as with
peacemaking. In the absence of an active mediator, therefore, even if the players are not actually
in conﬂict, the sharing is as if they were in it.
4.2 Indirect (mediated) Negotiations
The game that we analyze is as follows: at any stage t, the mediator meets with the party
that has the right to make a proposal (player i). This player makes a proposal. The mediator
meets with player j and decides whether or not to submit to him the proposal of player i.I f
player j receives the proposal and accepts, the game ends. If j rejects (or does not receive the
oﬀer), either of the two parties may decide to start the conﬂict. If the oﬀer is rejected (or not
submitted) but neither player opts out, bargaining goes on to the following round.
There are interesting eﬀects that may arise when we allow the mediator to intervene in a
peacekeeping scenario, that is, before any of the players opts out and moves to a peacemaking
situation. First, the lack of conﬂict costs per-period of delay in peacekeeping negotiations,
makes the mediator be less constrained about eﬃciency considerations, which may ease her
intervention in terms of achieving a higher equality, for a given level of α. Second, this eﬀect can
be outweighed, since the player that loses by this increased equality may have more incentives to
opt out and start the conﬂict. The formal statement of the results is the subject of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 6 For the mediated game in a peacekeeping situation with outside options, where
the outside payoﬀs are such that s ≥ P∗
i + P∗









 • If P∗
i ≤ P∗
j −
¯ ¯ ¯s − 2P∗
j





































From this general case, we can extract some preliminary insights on the role of a mediator
in a peacekeeping negotiation. First, and fully consistent with our previous results, a necessary
condition for the mediator to have an active role in the negotiation process is that she is actually
willing to sacriﬁce eﬃciency in order to induce a higher equality. Otherwise, she becomes a purely
passive observer. However, and contrary to the peacemaking case, this necessary condition is
not suﬃcient. In this setting it can be the case that, even a fully equality-seeking mediator
(α →∞ ), is incapable of altering the equilibrium sharing. This occurs when the sharing that
results from the outside options is very unbalanced against the proposer and, thus, the mediator
loses her capacity to eﬀectively threaten him.
In those cases in which the mediator actually alters the distribution, her intervention is of a
diﬀerent nature than in a peacemaking environment. In a peacekeeping negotiation, the threat
of the mediator is not to reduce the proposer’s ﬁrst-mover advantage and give it to the responder,
but rather to actually reinforce the implicit threat made by the proposer himself of moving to
the conﬂict. This is the best the mediator can aim at achieving, since the outside option is a
safe outcome for the players.
L e tu sn o wm o v et oam o r es p e c i ﬁc case in which we can extract more meaningful implications
of the mediator’s activity: the equality-seeking mediator (α →∞ ). Moreover, when negotiations
are broken, the outside option is, in fact, the beginning of the conﬂict. This means that the
agents will suﬀer one round of damages (with costs (1 − δ)c for player 1 and 0 f o rp l a y e r2 )










6We assume that there is no delay in the start of the negotiations after the conﬂi c tb r e a k so u t . T h i sa l l o w s
us to eliminate a purely artiﬁcial source of equity given by discounting (that reduces the present value of the
diﬀerences in payoﬀsa c r o s sa g e n t s ) .
7The posterior analysis and results correspond to the main range of the parameter space. It only does not











result obtained in Corollary 4 is the opposite, but the results of Corollary 5 and Proposition 7 remain the same.




(1−δ) , the results obtained in Corollaries 4 and 5 and Proposition 7 are the opposite.







 Note that this is the most natural case of study. The parties try to negotiate in the absence of
ac o n ﬂict and they know that if, eventually, one of the parties decides to start the conﬂict, this
will imply a ﬂow of damages (unevenly distributed among the players) and the continuation of
the negotiations in a new scenario (peacemaking). Focusing on this case, we ﬁnd the following
corollaries:
Corollary 4 An equality-seeking mediator (α →∞ ) will, at equilibrium:
• Always be able to aﬀect the equality of the sharing when the “strong” player moves ﬁrst.
• Never be able to aﬀect the equality of the sharing when the “weak” player moves ﬁrst.
Proof. When α →∞ , the mediator can alter the equilibrium proposal of the player with




¯ ¯s − 2P∗
j
¯ ¯.
Consider ﬁrst the case i =2(i.e., the strong player). Using the fact that P∗
1 <P ∗
2 it is
straightforward to see that the above condition is always fulﬁlled for the equilibrium values.
Conversely, consider the case i =1(i.e., the weak player). Substituting the equilibrium
values for P∗
1 and P∗
2, we rewrite the above condition as
P
Ipm
1 − (1 − δ)c>s− P
Ipm
2 .





Again, and analogous to a peacemaking situation, we observe how giving the initiative to the
weak player is a source of problems for the mediator. Recall that, in a peacemaking negotiation,
the reason was that the weak player was able to make more demanding proposals, exploiting
the fact that, if they were blocked by the mediator, this would imply high damages for him. In
a peacekeeping setting, the result, although related, is of a diﬀerent nature. Here, the eﬀect is
not quantitative (submitting more uneven proposals) but rather qualitative (when the mediator
is really active). The quantitative aspect is lost, since the players always link their proposals
to ﬁxed quantities (the outside option). What the mediator loses by giving the initiative to
the weak player is the capacity to eﬀectively threaten the proposer with executing the outside
option, as this sharing would be very unbalanced.
Corollary 5 In peacekeeping, when the mediator’s intervention alters the behavior of the
players, the equality achieved is always smaller than in peacemaking.































 It is straightforward to see that the equality induced is higher, the higher is α. For α →∞we
















2, then the inequality of the sharing is given by:
2x∗
i − s =
¯ ¯ ¯P
Ipm



















This completes the proof.
Even if, in peacemaking negotiations, the fact of being in conﬂict was a source of weakness
for the mediator, the situation in peacekeeping environments, instead of improving, turns out
to be even worse. The reason is that, even if in peacekeeping negotiations when the mediator
delays the agreement this does not imply a priori conﬂict costs for the parties, the agents link
the rejection of their proposals to the beginning of the conﬂict. This severely undermines the
capacity of the mediator to induce an egalitarian sharing.
It is direct to see that, if the mediator can actually aﬀect the proposer’s strategy and,
hence, the sharing of the surplus, the distribution is completely determined by the value of the
outside option of the players. This implies that the equilibrium level of inequality is the same
independently of which player starts the negotiation.8 This is in contrast with the result in
peacemaking, where the mediator strictly preferred to give the initiative to the ex-ante “strong”
player.
However, so far, we have not seen when the presence of an active mediator is really beneﬁcial
in terms of equality. That is, we have not compared the degree of inequality obtained with
indirect (mediated) negotiations with that resulting from a direct (face-to-face) negotiation. By
doing so, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 7 In a peacekeeping environment, undertaking mediated negotiations never gen-
erates a higher equality than a direct negotiation in which the weak player is the ﬁrst proposer.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing the equilibrium sharing in Lemma 1 and Proposition
6.
This result shows the extent to which the position of the mediator is weakened in a peace-
keeping scenario. Her intervention by threatening the parties with blocking their proposals, is








 completely unable to induce a more egalitarian sharing than if she allowed the parties to ne-
gotiate directly (giving the initiative to the weak player). Moreover, it can be checked that,
whenever the mediator is active at equilibrium, i.e., she actually alters the proposals of the
players, then her presence is detrimental for equality.
The intuition for this result is the following: in the direct negotiation case (Ponsatí and
Sákovics, 1998), even the weak player, when being the proposer, can credibly commit to opting
out, which prevents the responder from using all his bargaining power. When the mediator
intervenes (indirect negotiation case), the proposer has to credibly threaten, not only the re-
sponder, but also the mediator. Since the mediator has preferences over equality and eﬃciency,
the proposers “lose” bargaining power with respect to the responders when α increases since, for
as u ﬃciently high α, the mediator may prefer not to submit a given oﬀer and go to the outside
option. The threat of the mediator to actually implement the outside option is, in this case,
detrimental
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have proposed a simple model of bargaining that, nevertheless, has allowed us to analyze
and compare the role of mediation in conﬂicts of diﬀerent nature, where two parties negotiate
to share a ﬁxed surplus.
We have distinguished between peacemaking (in-conﬂict) negotiations and peacekeeping (pre-
conﬂict) negotiations. The main diﬀerence is that in a peacemaking scenario, since the conﬂict
has already started, the players bear costs per-period of conﬂict. Since these costs are diﬀerent,
the players are asymmetric.
We analyze the negotiations in a peacemaking scenario in order to study the role of a mediator
that strategically intervenes in the bargaining process. We observe two important implications
of this analysis: ﬁrst, even if the mediator is willing to sacriﬁce completely eﬃciency in order
to achieve a higher equality, she is not able to induce a fully egalitarian sharing. Second, we
prove that more equality can be achieved by giving the initiative in the negotiation process
to the ex-ante strong player (in contrast with unmediated bargaining processes). This can be
explained by the fact that, in mediated negotiations, the weak player has a strong position with
respect to the mediator, who becomes, in fact, the real “competitor” of the player.
In a peacekeeping scenario, the conﬂict is not active yet and it is only a potential outcome of
the process. In this setting, the absence of conﬂict costs would, in principle, help the mediator
in achieving a higher equality of the ﬁnal agreement. But the result is completely the opposite.
In peacekeeping negotiations, the agents use the threat of starting the conﬂict, and, as a result,
the position of the mediator, and her capacity to induce an egalitarian sharing, is weakened with







 At this point we can bring back the interview with a UN international negotiator, quoted
in the Introduction. The words by Françesc Vendrell seemed support a particular strategy of
negotiation: The option of conducting indirect (mediated) negotiations is better in peacemaking
environments, while direct (face-to-face) negotiations dominate in peacekeeping settings. Our
results are consistent with Vendrell’s choice. First, we have seen that, in many instances, a
mediated negotiation can achieve more equality than a direct one in a peacemaking environment.
In this situation, the capacity of the mediator to “ﬁlter” proposals between the parties can be
a useful distributive tool. Second, we have shown that in peacekeeping negotiations, this is no
longer the case. Using the mediator as a ﬁlter between the two parties can never increase the
egalitarianism of the ﬁnal sharing and, hence, never improves over a direct negotiation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this model has to be seen as a ﬁrst step in a new line of
research. We believe that studying the impact that a mediator (understood as a strategic player)
can have over an ongoing negotiation process, is a potentially fruitful area of research. Despite
their interest, these issues, however, remained unattended by the literature. In this model we
have dealt with a simple, yet interesting case: mediation under complete information. The next
natural step is to study these same issues in a richer framework, where the parties negotiate in
a two-sided asymmetric information environment. This would allow to analyze the capacity of







 6A p p e n d i x
Proof. (Proposition 3)
The following stationary strategies are the only stationary strategies that can be optimal for
the two agents involved in the negotiation: agent 1 always oﬀers (x,s −x) and rejects anything
less than w. Agent 2 always oﬀers (y,s− y) and rejects anything less than z. Moreover, at
equilibrium it must be the case that w = y and z = s − x.
The necessary conditions for the strategies above mentioned to be a stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium (SSPE) are the following:
(1) y ≥ δx− (1 − δ)c.
(2) s − x ≥ δ(s − y).
(3) x ≥ δy − (1 − δ)c.
(4) s − y ≥ δ(s − x).
(M1)
(1−δ)
α (s + c) ≥ |2x − s| − |δ(2y − s) − (1 − δ)c|.
(M2)
(1−δ)
α (s + c) ≥ |2y − s| − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c|.
Now we prove the following intermediate result that will help us to characterize the equilib-
rium outcomes:
• If at equilibrium (1) is not binding, then y ≤ s
2.
• If at equilibrium (2) is not binding, then x ≥ s
2.
Consider, ﬁrst, the case in which (1) is not binding and assume that the equilibrium is such
that y>s
2. Consider the following deviation for player 2 when he is the proposer: y0 = y − ε,
with ε>0 and suﬃciently small. Since (1) was not binding, there exist values of ε>0 for which
this condition still holds and, therefore, player 1 still ﬁnds the oﬀer acceptable. Moreover, since
y>s
2, the condition M2 is still fulﬁlled for y0 and the new oﬀer of player 2 is not blocked by the
mediator. Therefore, player 2 has a proﬁtable deviation since the new oﬀer gives him a larger
share of the surplus. An analogous argument allows to show that x<s
2 cannot be sustained as
an equilibrium when (2) is not binding.
Now we prove that the equilibrium outcome cannot be such that conditions (1) and (M1)
are binding. In this case, the only candidate equilibrium payoﬀs are the following (restricting
to y ≤ s
2 and δ(2x − s) ≤ (1 − δ)c, since the rest of the cases are eliminated because either
condition (2) or (M2) are not satisﬁed):
x =
s(1 − δ + α + αδ)
2α(1 + δ2)
+

















 We are now in the position to fully characterize the outcome of the indirect (mediated)
negotiations, in the presence of a type-α mediator. We use the following notation:
α1 =
(1 + δ)2(s + c)
s(1 − δ2) − c(1 − δ)2; α2 =
(1 − δ2 +2 δ)(s + c)





(1 − δ2)(s + c)
(1 − δ)2s +( 3+δ2)c
; α5 =
δ(1 + δ)(s + c)
c(1 − δ)
;
The oﬀers made by the players in the SSPE are the following:





























• For α2 ≤ α ≤ α1,
x =


























1+δ2 and 1 ≤ α ≤ min{α2,α 3}, or if s
c ≤ 1+2δ−δ2
δ(1+δ) and α ≥ 1,
x =




s(α +2 αδ − 1) − c(1 + α)
2α(1 + δ)
. (PM2)
• If α3 ≤ α ≤ α2, there is multiplicity of equilibria:
— If α ≥ α4, the equilibria are (PM1) and (PM2).







 — If α ≤ 1, the equilibria are (UM) and (PM1).
Case 1 (Unmediated Eq. - UM)
Conditions (1) and (2) hold with equality. If this happens we obtain (x,s−x) and (y,s−y)












α (s + c) ≥ |2x − s| − |δ(2y − s) − (1 − δ)c| ⇐⇒
(1−δ)
α (s + c) ≥ 1








α (s + c) ≥ |2y − s| − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| ⇐⇒
(1−δ)









2,t h a ti s ,|2x − s| = s − 2x = 1
1+δ (2δc− s(1 − δ)). Then, we also have:




c(1 + δ2) − δs(1 − δ)
¢
.
In this case, we can prove that (M1) is always satisﬁed because
1
1+δ




c(1 + δ2) − δs(1 − δ)
¢
< 0.
If we check for (M2), we get:
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c) ≥ |2y − s| − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| ⇔
(1 − δ)
α










c(1 + δ2) − δs(1 − δ)
¢
=( 1− δ)(s + c).
A n dt h i si ss a t i s ﬁed iﬀ α ≤ 1.
Case 1.2
x ≥ s
2, that is, |2x − s| =2 x − s = 1
1+δ (s(1 − δ) − 2δc).
Case (a):
|δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| = δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c = 1
1+δ
¡
δs(1 − δ) − c(1 + δ2)
¢
.
If we rewrite (M1):
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c) ≥ s
µ















 If we rewrite (M2):
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c) ≥ s
µ








= z2 >z 1.
So the necessary condition is (M2), and therefore we need:
α ≤
(1 − δ2)(s + c)
(1 − δ)2s +( 3+δ2)c
,




|δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| =( 1− δ)c − δ(2x − s)= 1
1+δ
¡
c(1 + δ2) − δs(1 − δ)
¢
.
Again, rewriting (M1) and (M2) we obtain,
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c) ≥ z1, (M1)
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c) ≥ (1 − δ)(s + c), (M2)
and since (1 − δ)(s + c) >z 1, the necessary condition is again (M2), which, to be satisﬁed,
implies α ≤ 1.







under which the candidate equilibrium payoﬀs are the ones obtained from the direct (face-to-
face) negotiation.
Case 2 (Fully mediated-FM)
Conditions (M1) and (M2) hold with equality, that is,
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c)=|2x − s| − |δ(2y − s) − (1 − δ)c|, (M1)
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c)=|2y − s| − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c|. (M2)
Note ﬁr s tt h a t ,i nt h i sc a s e ,w em u s th a v ex ≥ s
2 and y ≤ s
2. Otherwise, players 1 and 2,




(s + c)=2 x − s − (1 − δ)c − δ(s − 2y), (M1)
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c)=s − 2y − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c|. (M2)
Case 2.1
|δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| =( 1− δ)c − δ(2x − s).





















 We have to check if conditions (1) and (2) of equilibrium are satisﬁed.
We get the following conditions:
Necessary condition for (1) to be satisﬁed: α ≥ 1.
Necessary condition for (2) to be satisﬁed:
α
¡
s(1 + δ2) − c(1 + 2δ − δ2)
¢
≥ (s + c)(1 + 2δ − δ2).
-If s
c < 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 , this condition is never satisﬁed.
-If s
c ≥ 1+2δ−δ2
1+δ2 , we need the following condition for existence of equilibrium:
α ≥
(s + c)(1 + 2δ − δ2)
s(1 + δ2) − c(1 + 2δ − δ2)
. (ii)
We can easily prove that condition (ii) implies (i).
S i n c ew ea r ei nt h ec a s ew h e r e(1−δ)c ≥ δ(2x−s), we need the following condition for this
to hold:
α ≥












1+δ2 , the candidate equilib-
rium oﬀe r sa r et h ep r e v i o u so n e s .
Case 2.2
|δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| = δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c.





















Note that we do not have always y ≤ s
2 and x ≥ s
2. If we had y ≤ s
2, then we would also have
x ≥ s
2. The necessary condition for y ≤ s
2 is:
α ≤
(1 + δ)(s + c)
c(1 − δ)
. (iv)
As u ﬃcient condition for this to be satisﬁed is α<1+δ
1−δ.
The necessary condition to be in the case (1 − δ)c ≤ δ(2x − s) is
α ≤
δ(1 + δ)(s + c)
c(1 − δ)
. (v)
We check the conditions for (1) and (2) to be satisﬁed.
Necessary condition for (1) to be satisﬁed is
α ≥
(s + c)(1 + δ)2








 The necessary condition for (2) to be satisﬁed is
α ≥
(1 + δ)2(s + c)
s(1 − δ2) − c(1 − δ)2.
Then, if
(1+δ)2(s+c)
s(1−δ2)−c(1−δ)2 ≤ α ≤
δ(1+δ)(s+c)
c(1−δ) ,a n ds
c ≥ 1+2δ−δ2
δ(1+δ) , the mentioned oﬀers are a potential
equilibrium.
Case 3 (Partially mediated-PM)
We study the case when conditions (2) and (M2) are binding, which again implies that, at
equilibrium, y ≤ s
2 :
s − x = δ(s − y), (2)
(1 − δ)
α
(s + c)=s − 2y − |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c|. (M2)
Case 3.1
We analyze ﬁrst the case where |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| =( 1−δ)c−δ(2x−s). In this case the
candidate equilibrium oﬀers are the following:
y =
s(α +2 αδ − 1) − c(1 + α)
2α(1 + δ)
,
x = s(1 − δ)+δy.
For the case 2x ≤ s, we can prove that condition (M1) always holds. The necessary condition
for (1) to hold is y ≥ δs−c
1+δ , and we also need x ≤ s
2 (which implies y ≤ s
2). This implies that
1 ≤ α ≤
δ(s+c)
s−δc .
For the case 2x ≥ s, we have to add a necessary condition for (M1) to hold, which is
y ≤
s(1−δ−α+3αδ)
4αδ , and impose x ≥ s
2 and (1 − δ)c ≥ δ(2x − s). If we put all these necessary
conditions together, we obtain the following:
If s
c ≤ 1−δ2+2δ
1+δ2 , we need α ≥ 1.
If s
c ≥ 1−δ2+2δ




We analyze now the case where |δ(2x − s) − (1 − δ)c| = δ(2x−s) −(1 −δ)c. The candidate
equilibrium oﬀers are:
y =
s(α + δ − αδ +2 αδ2 − 1) − c(1 − α)(1 − δ)
2α(1 + δ2)
,
x = s(1 − δ)+δy.
Checking for all the conditions required we get the following necessary conditions for the above














 Given all these candidate equilibria, we can check that, for the cases 1 and 3, there exists an
overlapping of equilibrium oﬀers for some regions.
This completes the proof.
Proof. (Corollary 2)
Given the payoﬀs obtained for the case when α → +∞, we can easily prove the following:
• For the case s
c ≥
(1−2δ−δ2)
1+δ2 , the diﬀerence in payoﬀs if the weakest player (player 1) starts
the negotiation is
(1−δ2)c






• For the case s
c ≤
(1−2δ−δ2)
1+δ2 , the diﬀerence in payoﬀs if the weakest player (player 1) starts
the negotiation is s−δc




This completes the proof.
Proof. (Corollary 3)







¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s(1 − δ) − 2δc
1+δ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =
(
s(1−δ)−2δc
1+δ , if δ ≤ e δ
2δc−s(1−δ)
1+δ , if δ ≥ e δ




Take the case s
c ≥ 1+2δ−δ2











Take the case s
c ≤ 1+2δ−δ2





Note that ∆PDpm =0for δ = e δ, and it is decreasing in δ for δ ≤ e δ and increasing in δ for δ ≥ e δ.
In the same way, note that ∆PIpm decreases with δ.
Proof. (Proposition 6)
When the outside payoﬀsa r es u c ht h a ts = P∗
i + P∗
j , note that, since the outside payoﬀs
sum up to s, and the players have the possibility of opting out at any time of the game, the
only equilibrium agreement is exactly their outside payoﬀs, because neither player will accept
anything less.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r es>P∗
i +P∗
j , since we concentrate in the case where the threat of breaking
the negotiations and moving to the outside option is always credible for the proposer, the







 negotiations and move to the outside-option in case this oﬀer is not accepted (or not submitted by
the mediator). By the same reasoning, the responder will accept this oﬀer whenever submitted.
The proposal has to be such that the following restrictions are fulﬁlled:











¯ ¯ ¯. Otherwise, the mediator prefers to block the
proposal and induce the players to move to the outside option.
2. s − xi ≥ P∗
j . Otherwise, the responder, even if the mediator submits the proposal, will
prefer to reject it and ensure the outside option payoﬀs.
3. xi ≥ P∗
i . The proposer has to gain, at least, the same payoﬀs as in the outside option.
Taking this into account, let us see when x∗
i = s−P∗
j constitutes an equilibrium oﬀer. Note
that this corresponds to the Ponsatí-Sákovics oﬀer and (by 2.) it is the maximum the proposer
can aim at achieving.
First, it is straightforward, since s>P∗
1 + P∗
2, that this oﬀer fulﬁlls 3.
It fulﬁlls 1. if and only if































¯ ¯s − 2P∗
j
¯ ¯. (CP)
It can be checked, moreover, that a suﬃcient condition for (CP) to hold is that P∗
j ≥ s
2.









¯ ¯ ¯s − 2P∗
j








j constitutes an equilibrium oﬀe ri fa n do n l yi f :(CP) holds or, in case
it does not hold, if α ≤ α0
i.
Otherwise, this proposal will not be submitted by the mediator. In this case, the proposer
will ask for himself, the maximum share that is compatible with the block-pass decision of the
mediator. Therefore, x∗



























It can be easily checked that, ﬁrst x∗
i ≥ P∗
i and, hence 3. is fulﬁlled and that 2. is fulﬁlled as
well since x∗
i ≤ s − P∗
j (given P∗
j < s
2, in this case).
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Ipm Dpm P P ∆ > ∆  
Ipm Dpm P P ∆ < ∆
Ipm Dpm P P ∆ > ∆
δ1  δ2 0 
Figure 2: Comparison of the equality achieved in a direct and in an indirect negotiation by
an equality-seeking (α →∞ ) mediator.
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